



Are Canadians Stealth Democrats? An American Idea Comes North

Michael M. Atkinson, Stephen White, Loleen Berdahl & David McGrane

To cite this article: Michael M. Atkinson, Stephen White, Loleen Berdahl & David McGrane (2016) Are Canadians Stealth Democrats? An American Idea Comes North, American Review of Canadian Studies, 46:1, 55-73, DOI: [10.1080/02722011.2016.1154880](https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2016.1154880)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2016.1154880>



Published online: 04 May 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Are Canadians Stealth Democrats? An American Idea Comes North

Michael M. Atkinson^a, Stephen White^b, Loleen Berdahl^c and David McGrane^d

^aJohnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Saskatchewan Campus, Saskatoon, Canada; ^bPolitical Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; ^cPolitical Studies, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada; ^dPolitical Studies, St. Thomas More College, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada

ABSTRACT

In an influential 2002 study, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse make the provocative argument that high numbers of Americans seek “stealth democracy,” that is, processes that discover the will of the people without requiring substantial citizen effort. This article applies the concept in a Canadian province and argues that the stealth democracy measure represents an ambiguous amalgam of attitudes that are only loosely related to one another, and which do not appear to represent a single, underlying concept. We draw on 2011 Saskatchewan Election Study data and find that Saskatchewan responses to the stealth democracy items generally parallel the responses gathered in previous studies conducted in the United States, Finland, Britain, and Australia. We move beyond these studies by examining the components of the stealth democracy index. We conclude by suggesting that the concept of stealth democracy be rebuilt to better distinguish among attitudes toward democracy, politics, and governing.

KEYWORDS

Stealth democracy; public opinion; public attitudes; Canada; Saskatchewan

In an important and influential book on the state of democracy in the United States, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002) distinguish between Americans’ satisfaction with the process and the outcomes of democratic decision-making. They make the provocative argument that it is the process of democratic decision-making with which citizens express most discontent. While Americans are relatively satisfied with the products of democracy, they are deeply dissatisfied with the way policies are created. According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, citizens are particularly suspicious of politicians and special interests. They have absorbed the message that self-serving behavior is rampant among the political class, that the public interest has no serious defenders, and that the political process entails “minutiae, money and malarkey” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 46).

According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, American citizens are unwilling to correct this situation by assuming greater personal responsibility themselves in the political process. Instead, they are inclined to endorse what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call “stealth democracy”: processes in which the will of the people somehow finds

expression without continual input and monitoring from citizens themselves. Stealth democrats seek leaders who are committed to the public interest and whose internal ethical software rejects self-interested behavior. They are looking for Mansbridge's "gyroscopic" representatives, politicians who "act in ways the voter approves *without* external incentives" (Mansbridge 2003, 520, emphasis in original).

It would be wrong to characterize this preference as deference to authority. Stealth democrats are not deferential; they are discouraged and suspicious. But they are not prepared, without significant provocation, to engage in lengthy deliberations or to assume the reins of authority themselves. They prefer a form of automatic government in which those with expertise and integrity are afforded ample opportunity to use these qualities for the public good.

To what extent are stealth democracy preferences an artifact of the American political experience, with its history of constitutional division, polarized parties, and the prevalence of money in its politics (King 2012)? Perhaps not much. Recent empirical studies in Finland (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009), Britain (Hansard Society 2012; Webb 2013), and Australia (Evans, Stoker, and Nasir 2013) find a similar pattern of stealth democracy preferences outside of the United States. Allen and Birch (2014, 8) add that the process preferences and process perceptions of Britons and Americans are "broadly comparable." It is also true, however, that outside of the United States stealth democracy is not a uniform preference. Where Hibbing and Theiss-Morse tend to treat stealth democracy as a widely shared predisposition, subsequent studies have found that standard demographic variables, such as education and political interest, are strong predictors of stealth democracy preferences.

This article expands the emerging scholarship on stealth democracy by exploring, for the first time, the prevalence of stealth democracy attitudes in Canada, specifically in Saskatchewan, where the authors conducted the province's first post-election study in 2011. But our research goes beyond the addition of another empirical referent. We examine the component parts of the stealth democracy index and question whether what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call stealth democracy is as coherent or as complete a concept as they would have us believe. Extending their research into Canada, a country with a substantially different institutional heritage (Mendelsohn 1996), gives us an opportunity to explore the limits of stealth democracy's application.

Using Saskatchewan as a case study, the research addresses four sets of questions:

- (1) To what extent are Saskatchewan stealth democracy attitudes similar to or different from attitudes found in the United States, Finland, Britain, and Australia?
- (2) Who are the stealth democrats? To what extent are the predictors of stealth democracy attitudes similar in Saskatchewan to those found in other jurisdictions? To what extent do predictors vary across the four components of the stealth democracy construct?
- (3) Do voters and non-voters differ with respect to stealth democracy attitudes?
- (4) Overall, is stealth democracy a viable construct?

This article is organized to answer these questions sequentially. The "Stealth democrats" section reviews recent research from other countries, outlines the components of stealth democracy, and considers the degree to which these components find favor among citizens in Saskatchewan. The "Who are the stealth democrats?" section explores the

backgrounds of stealth democrats and considers whether stealth democrat attitudes are internally coherent. The “Stealth democracy and voting” section considers how voters and non-voters vary in stealth democracy attitudes. The “Conclusion” argues that notwithstanding consistency in findings across a variety of countries, the concept of stealth democracy itself needs refinement.

Stealth democrats: what’s their beef?

Not everyone enjoys politics. In fact, our collective taste for politics appears to have been waning rapidly since the late 1960s. We are less trusting of politicians and less convinced that they are motivated by an interest in securing the common good (Hay 2007). Disenchantment is revealed in many ways, but of particular note is the consistent and, by now, longstanding decline in voter turnout in the OECD countries. Some countries maintain a *relatively* high level of participation, and a few have even experienced the opposite trend (higher voting participation), but particularly in the so-called market economies, the trend has been unmistakably downward. Those who are eligible to vote for the first time are particularly inclined to demure (Blais et al. 2004), and having once passed up the opportunity, they show less inclination to acquire the voting habit (Franklin 2004).

The decline in voter turnout is matched by a decline in party membership (Mair and Van Biezen 2001), raising the question of whether political parties are any longer the mobilizers of electoral opinion they once were. On the bright side, at least for those who retain a faith in politics, new avenues of participation have emerged. Citizens have taken to signing petitions, boycotting products, and campaigning against companies that are deemed to have violated their social responsibilities (Norris 2002, 198). Note, however, that these forms of participation are typically negative: they focus on objecting to developments rather than reasoning or persuading, two of the more prominent values in the participationist agenda. Hay (2007) observes that protests are really expressions of political exasperation rather than strategic efforts to secure specific concessions. In the eyes of citizens, not only do politicians and political parties show a lamentable inability to confront the major issues of our time—from climate change to economic inequality—they are also presumed to be driven entirely by instrumental reasoning and selfish motives.

One way of interpreting these observations is to argue that what has changed is the outlook and preferences of voters themselves. Far from deferring to their betters, the new brand of citizen, post-Watergate, is much more willing to criticize government and much more consumed with improving accountability. Rather than being turned off politics by observing discrepancies between democratic promise and democratic performance, dissatisfied citizens are among the more politically engaged (Nevitte and White 2012, 72). These new “critical citizens” (Norris 1999) are less patient than previous generations with the prevarications and excuses of politicians and much more nuanced in their analysis of issues than are plodding partisans. Post-material in their orientations, they are concerned with the quality of life and not just the quantity of things.

The stealth democracy thesis is not entirely at odds with this perspective: citizens are critical; they want things from politics that they are not getting. But it is less a matter of changes in the demands of more sophisticated citizens, and more a matter of complaints about the supply of competent and ethical political leaders (Besley 2006; Hay

2007). True, citizens are becoming more disenchanting, more critical, and less satisfied, but according to the stealth democracy argument, the source of their discontent lies in the inability of politicians to deliver a brand of politics that does not require constant oversight and rigorous reflection. If politicians could do their job, eschew personal privileges, and deliver good government rather than endless and pointless debate, the need to engage in extra-electoral participation might be less pressing.

What, exactly, defines a stealth democrat? Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that stealth democrats do not like compromise, conflict, or debate. Stealth democrats assume that, broadly speaking, most Americans agree on policy issues and therefore conflict and compromise are unnecessary and unproductive (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 134).¹ In the stealth democrat's view, it is chiefly those who represent special interests who are the originators of conflict, while delays and inaction work mostly to their benefit. Second, and equally important, stealth democrats feel that politicians are irretrievably compromised and cannot be trusted to promote worthy causes if those are at odds with their personal interests. Therefore, stealth democrats would prefer to leave as many decisions as possible to "non-elected experts" including successful business people.

Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, 143) use four questions from the Democratic Processes Survey (conducted by Gallup in 1998) to build their index of support for stealth democracy:

- (1) "Politicians would help the country more if they would just take action and stop talking on important issues."
- (2) "What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out one's principles."
- (3) "Government would run better if left up to independent non-elected experts."
- (4) "Government would run better if left up to successful business people."

They report that over 80 percent of respondents agreed that "elected officials should stop talking and take action" and 60 percent saw compromise as the equivalent of "selling out one's principles" (2002, 136). They conclude "... even though Americans say they want democratic decision-making, they do not believe standard elements of it, such as debate and compromise, are either helpful or necessary" (2002, 137). Not as many respondents were enamored of expert opinion, but Hibbing and Theiss-Morse observe that almost half of the respondents to the Democratic Processes Survey agreed that government would run better if decisions were made either by experts or by business people.

Are these results distinctly American or is this supposed predisposition in favor of efficient and uncontroversial decision-making shared by others? The first study to attempt a replication of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's research in a non-American setting examined stealth democracy attitudes in Finland, and concluded that the findings "correspond quite well with results from the United States" (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009, 1040). The authors also observe that results from the World Values study confirm that Finnish respondents are strongly inclined to endorse rule by experts in political matters. Adding to the debate, a recent British study (Webb 2013, 752) finds "fairly widespread, though not overwhelming" agreement with stealth democracy views amongst the British public. These findings are supported by a second British study on the same topic (Hansard Society 2012). Further, recent Australian research (Evans, Stoker, and Nasis 2013, 11) found that "Australian citizens have stealth attitudes to match those found elsewhere."

How do Saskatchewan attitudes compare to those observed in the United States, Finland, Britain, and Australia? To answer this question, we draw on data from the 2011 Saskatchewan Election Study (SKES), which surveyed political attitudes and behaviors in the province immediately following a provincial election that took place on November 7, 2011 (see Methodological Appendix). While we have no reason to assume that Saskatchewan attitudes regarding stealth democracy are in any way atypical of what might be found in the Canadian population overall, the SKES is the only Canadian dataset to date that replicates the stealth democracy questions and we are therefore limited in our ability to generalize the results to Canada as a whole.

As Table 1 indicates, Saskatchewan responses to the stealth democracy items largely parallel the responses gathered in previous studies. The vast majority of our sample (over eight in 10 respondents) prefers more action and less talk. These findings are comparable to those in the Finnish, British, Australian, and American studies: the action over talk item finds significant endorsement everywhere. Timing may have contributed to the Saskatchewan finding; our survey came at the end of an election campaign in which all respondents had been subjected to a certain degree of “talking.” A preference for action over discussion might be natural under the circumstances, although the magnitude of this preference and its correspondence to other findings should give democrats some cause for concern regarding the tolerance of citizens for a central feature of democratic governance, namely deliberation. Turning to the other elements of stealth democracy, almost half of the Saskatchewan respondents think of compromise as a sell-out of principles—an almost identical proportion to Finland and a similar proportion to Britain (2011 data), but well below that found in the United States, Australia, and in the 2012 British data. Given that politics is sometimes described as “the art of the possible,” and compromise is often seen as an enduring political virtue (Crick 2000), it is sobering to note how many citizens see it as something less noble. For practicing politicians, consensus on policy does not mean the end of principled conflict; current policy is better thought of as the “constrained space” in which conflict continues to find expression (Heffernan 2002). Many respondents do not seem to see it that way. However it is conceived or defended, compromise does not appear to have a strong hold over respondents in any of these countries, especially when it is framed to come at the expense of principle.

Another part of stealth democracy is the willingness of citizens to rely on experts as opposed to duly elected politicians. Here, Saskatchewan respondents stand apart from the other jurisdictions: four in 10 Saskatchewan respondents express a preference for expert decision-making, compared to three in 10 in Finland, Australia, and the United States, and only two in 10 in Britain (2011 data only; the 2012 responses are notably higher). However, when it comes to turning over decision-making to “successful business people,” the Saskatchewan, British, and American respondents all showed similar, somewhat tepid, enthusiasm (approximately 30 percent in agreement in all three jurisdictions). The Finns showed even less enthusiasm for the option of entrusting business, while Australians were more supportive of this idea. Only the British (2011 data only) and Australian samples preferred business people to “independent, non-elected experts.”

Overall, in the five jurisdictions within which stealth democracy has been empirically studied, robust stealth democracy preferences are present, and on some measures even dominant. These findings lead to two tentative observations. First, despite the noted



Table 1. Stealth democracy attitudes in Saskatchewan (% agree) compared to other jurisdictions.

	Saskatchewan, 2011	Australia, 2013 (Evans, Stoker, and Nasis 2013)	Britain, 2012 (as reported in Evans, Stoker, and Nasis 2013)	Britain, 2011 (Webb 2013)	Finland, 2007 (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009)	United States, 1998 (Hibbing and Theiss- Morse 2002)
Stop talking and take action	87%	95%	91%	60%	83%	86%
Compromise is selling out	44%	74%	80%	39%	46%	60%
Leave decisions to independent non-elected experts	41%	34%	51%	20%	33%	31%
Leave decisions to successful business people	30%	43%	47%	28%	19%	32%

points of variation, there appears to be a remarkable degree of similarity in responses to at least some questions amongst the countries studied. Second, not all of the elements of the stealth democracy index are equally attractive to respondents. The preference for action over discussion is remarkably strong and consistent, but respondents exhibit far greater skepticism regarding technocratic governance by experts. As this work moves out from its American base, the need for contextualization regarding matters such as business acumen becomes increasingly apparent.

So far researchers have been willing to accept the Hibbing–Theiss-Morse view that stealth democracy is a coherent construct in which most citizens prefer competent leadership capable of delivering public policy with a minimum of political “malarkey.” It is possible, however, that stealth democracy attitudes represent less a rejection of politics than a plea for a better brand of politics, one in which principled action plays a central role. In what follows we consider the backgrounds of so-called stealth democrats to better understand the context for endorsing or rejecting stealth democracy. We also seek out correlates of the various components of stealth democracy rather than assume its empirical coherence.

Who are the stealth democrats?

Engagement in politics requires some assets, including minimum levels of interest and education. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect background variables to predict a propensity to endorse stealth democracy. The Hibbing and Theiss-Morse results are therefore somewhat unexpected: in their American sample, they find no significant correlation between any of the usual demographic variables and a preference for stealth democracy. The absence of any connection to education is particularly surprising. It seems reasonable to expect those with more educational resources to have the confidence required to make policy judgments, to resist leaning on “experts,” and to engage in the dialogue and compromise associated with the political process. The research from Great Britain and Finland, where education is a factor, appears to support this interpretation. Bengtsson and Mattila (2009) find that lower education is a significant predictor of stealth democracy preferences in Finland, and Webb (2013) finds similar results in Britain. In these countries, well-educated, politically knowledgeable citizens are not drawn to stealth democracy.² This is not to say that such individuals are interested in more opportunities for direct political participation (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Dalton, Birklin, and Drummond 2001); it is actually those with less knowledge, less education, and less interest who want more referendums and more opportunities to circumvent representative institutions.

There is not as much ambiguity within the existing studies regarding the importance of ideology and partisanship to stealth democracy preferences. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse find that Americans who identify with the Democratic Party are significantly less inclined to endorse stealth democratic traits than are non-partisans or Republicans. They are hard-pressed to account for this finding, mostly because in their rendering stealth democracy is a non-ideological and non-partisan predisposition, not an epiphenomenon with roots in ideology or partisanship.

Nonetheless, other studies, including our own, highlight the role of ideology. According to Bengtsson and Mattila, those possessed of a right-wing ideology are

more inclined to support the traits of stealth democracy, independent of education, income, or other demographic variables. Similarly, Webb's study of British attitudes finds that "liberal-authority ideology" is related to stealth democracy attitudes. We also consider the role of partisan identification in shaping stealth democracy attitudes. Aside from ideological commitments, identification with governing or opposition parties might be linked to stealth democracy attitudes. Support for governing or opposition parties is often associated with satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respectively, with the quality of democracy, and democratic procedures and institutions (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson et al. 2005). Finally, the existing studies present mixed findings with respect to the role of political interest. In their study of stealth democracy preferences in Finland, Bengtsson and Mattila (2009) find that political interest is not related to stealth democracy preferences, whereas in his study of British attitudes, Webb (2013) finds that stealth democracy preferences decrease as political interest rises.

Who are the stealth democrats in Saskatchewan? Are education, ideology, partisanship, and political interest significant predictors of stealth democracy preferences, as in other countries? To consider this question, we turn to a multivariate analysis of a stealth democracy index that ranges from 1 (low preference) to 4 (high preference). We employ OLS regression analysis to consider the effects of the key variables identified by previous research (see Methodological Appendix). As Table 2 indicates, education, political interest, and ideology are all significant predictors of stealth democracy preferences in Saskatchewan. Overall, stealth democrats in Saskatchewan are less interested in politics, less educated, and more conservative than those who have low stealth democracy scores.

Table 2. Predictors of stealth democracy attitudes, Saskatchewan 2011 (OLS).

	B SE	Standardized B
Constant	3.077*** (0.113)	
Political interest	-0.337*** (0.080)	-0.151
Education	-0.735*** (0.104)	-0.234
Limited government	0.120* (0.050)	0.076
Left ideological self-placement	-0.310** (0.093)	-0.108
Right ideological self-placement	-0.014 (0.075)	-0.007
No ideological self-placement	0.058 (0.061)	0.029
Government party identification	0.164 (0.100)	0.064
Opposition party identification	0.068 (0.117)	0.020
No party identification	0.038 (0.057)	0.028
Female	0.099* (0.040)	0.079
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.001
R ²	0.124	
N	1038	

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$.

While Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, 145–46) could find no impact from education, all of the other studies that considered education, including our Saskatchewan findings, report consistently higher stealth democracy scores among those with lower levels of education. For Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, the absence of an education effect is traceable to what they consider the lamentable tendency of American schools to focus on consensus. According to them, schools and foundations in the United States teach civic education in a manner that ignores conflict and underemphasizes the importance of compromise: “By adopting a head-in-the-sand approach to conflict, the educational community is unwittingly facilitating the lack of issue relevance in American politics and is encouraging students to conclude that real democracy is unnecessary and stealth democracy will do just fine” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 147).

Our findings, and those of the stealth democracy studies in Britain and Finland, are different. They suggest that education brings a more sophisticated appreciation of the demands and the nuances of politics. The Saskatchewan data also show that those with higher levels of interest in politics (“how interested were you in the recent provincial election campaign?”) are also significantly less enthusiastic about stealth democracy. These findings echo those in Britain where political interest has a stronger (negative) effect on stealth democracy than any other variable (Webb 2013, 13). In Finland, stealth democrats are generally less knowledgeable about politics rather than less interested (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009, 1043). But whether it is knowledge or interest that is missing, these findings are consistent with the view that stealth democrats are disengaged from the political process.

Finally, we find that those who place themselves on the “left” are less enthusiastic about stealth democracy, whereas those who prefer limited government are more supportive. In other words, preferences for stealth processes may reflect underlying ideological dispositions. The results from our study suggest that the explanation for stealth democracy that eluded Hibbing and Theiss-Morse may lie in the direction of perceptions regarding what constitutes good government. If, as they contend, stealth democrats are wary of self-interested politicians, then what better tactic than to shrink the landscape of public policy altogether and substitute it with the market? What is leftover can still be managed by experts, and probably should be. Removed are the vexing propensities of politicians to self-deal and play favorites.

The problem with all of these interpretations, our own included, is that whatever logical relationship may exist among the various components of the stealth democracy index, the evidence for empirical validity is limited. If these four items are indicators of a single construct called stealth democracy, then all four should be closely related to one another. More specifically, there ought to be evidence that these four items represent one latent variable. To assess the unidimensionality of the four items, we conducted a factor analysis. The results are presented in Table 3. According to the Kaiser criterion for principal factors analysis, two factors with Eigenvalues greater than zero should be retained (Dinno 2009, 291). An alternative approach to factor retention, parallel analysis (Horn 1965; Zwick and Velicer 1986), recommends that the size of the Eigenvalue for retained factors should exceed corresponding values from a factor analysis of randomly generated data with the same number of observations and variables (Mulaik 2009, 188–192). The parallel analysis results also suggest that two or more should be retained.

Table 3. Exploratory factor analysis of stealth democracy items (principal factors, rotated loadings).

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Communalities
Stop talking and take action	0.51	0.09	0.01	0.32
Compromise is selling out	0.43	0.05	0.19	0.32
Leave decisions to independent non-elected experts	0.28	0.46	-0.01	0.42
Leave decisions to successful business people	0.00	0.38	0.12	0.22
Factor Eigenvalue	1.16	0.11	0.01	
Parallel Analysis Eigenvalue (100 replications)	0.08	0.02	-0.02	

N = 873.

Method: Iterated Principal Factors, Promax rotation

Table 3 shows that there is no single underlying factor among these variables; there are at least two. The factor loadings are not very powerful, and there is only one strong loading (i.e. greater than 0.50) on either of the first two factors (Costello and Osborne 2005, 4). Moreover, there are low communalities for all of the items. In fact, for three of the four items, the communalities are so low (below .40) as to suggest they are only weakly related empirically. In short, these variables do not have a lot in common with each other. They are unreliable measures of the extracted factors, whatever those factors represent. These results are consistent with those of Webb (2013), who notes similarly low reliability amongst the measures in the British data. (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse say very little about relationships among the variables that make up the index in their own study.)

Given the low reliability and uncertain empirical validity of the stealth democracy construct, we turn to the predictors of the four index components. Doing so allows us to better consider whether respondents are revealing an underlying “stealth democracy” pattern to their responses, or whether each of the stealth democracy items is being judged on its merits. When the questions are interpreted independently, the effects of various predictor variables are revealed more clearly. Table 4 summarizes the results of ordered logistic regression analyses for each of the four components of the stealth democracy index.³ As the coefficients are not easy to interpret, we have transformed each of the statistically significant estimates into changes in predicted probabilities, by calculating the difference in the probability of expressing agreement with a stealth democracy statement as the variable of interest moves from its minimum to its maximum value. For each of these calculations, all of the other variables in the model are held constant.⁴ These are summarized in Table 5.

Education and political interest are the only two variables that are consistently, and negatively, associated with almost all of the stealth democracy components. Saskatchewan residents with the highest level of education are an estimated 42 percent less likely than those with the lowest level of education to agree that political compromise means “selling out.” Highly educated people are also less likely than the least educated to agree, especially “strongly agree” (42 percent less likely), that taking action is preferred over talking. They are also less likely to agree government would be run better by experts or business people (36 percent and 25 percent, respectively). The estimated effects of political interest are similar: the most politically interested are less likely than the least interested to believe that compromise means selling out (26 percent), that political action is better than talking (5 percent), and that government would run better by experts (22 percent). Simply put, for the better educated and the

Table 4. Predictors of individual stealth democracy items, Saskatchewan 2011 (ordered logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses).

	Compromise	Action	Experts	Business
Political interest	-1.079*** (0.270)	-0.662* (0.296)	-1.121*** (0.278)	-0.345 (0.308)
Education	-1.788*** (0.343)	-1.869*** (0.386)	-1.558*** (0.361)	-1.174** (0.376)
Limited government	0.062 (0.159)	-0.066 (0.175)	-0.0626 (0.172)	0.929*** (0.181)
Left ideological self-placement	-.693 (0.403)	-0.598 (0.399)	-0.350 (0.415)	-1.407** (0.634)
Right ideological self-placement	0.019 (0.233)	-0.093 (0.247)	-0.344 (0.279)	0.130 (0.237)
No ideological self-placement	0.394 (0.227)	0.344 (0.230)	0.007 (0.207)	-0.205 (0.210)
Government party identification	0.518 (0.348)	0.781* (0.355)	-0.148 (0.342)	0.898** (0.348)
Opposition party identification	0.932** (0.363)	1.087* (0.482)	0.324 (0.450)	-0.848 (0.509)
No party identification	0.269 (0.177)	0.080 (0.192)	0.072 (0.186)	0.103 (0.181)
Female	-0.035 (0.127)	0.436** (0.143)	0.238 (0.134)	0.072 (0.135)
Age	0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Cut1	-2.922 (0.382)	-4.944 (0.477)	-3.065 (0.357)	-1.039 (0.398)
Cut2	-1.139 (0.366)	-3.406 (0.433)	-1.664 (0.348)	0.413 (0.397)
Cut3	0.671 (0.362)	-1.357 (0.421)	0.503 (0.348)	2.140 (0.413)
McKelvey and Zavoina's R ²	0.091	0.087	0.081	0.151
N	963	999	949	1006

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$.

Table 5. Predicted probabilities, individual stealth democracy items, Saskatchewan 2011.

	Compromise	Action	Experts	Business
Political interest	-26 (-14)	-5 (-16)	-22 (-8)	.
Education	-42 (-23)	-15 (-42)	-36 (-14)	-25 (-8)
Limited government	.	.	.	19 (6)
Left ideological self-placement	.	.	.	-21 (-5)
Right ideological self-placement
No ideological self-placement
Government party identification	.	6 (19)	.	20 (8)
Opposition party identification	23 (12)	7 (25)	.	.
No party identification
Female	.	4 (11)	.	.
Age

Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from ordered logit estimates in Table 4. Each cell entry is the change in predicted probability of agreeing (somewhat or strongly), with predicted probability of strong agreement in parentheses as the variable moves from its minimum to maximum. All other variables in the model are held constant.

politically engaged, public policy in a democracy is not simply a matter of getting the right answers from experts and then implementing them. Politics involves value conflict, and resolving that kind of conflict requires talking and compromising, or at least more talking and compromising than the less educated and less politically engaged are willing to tolerate. The effects of ideology are most evident when it comes to allowing business leaders a privileged voice in policy. Saskatchewan residents

with the highest level of support for limited government are an estimated 19 percent more likely than those with the lowest levels of support for limited government to agree that government would run better if successful business people were making decisions. At the same time, those who place themselves on the left of the political spectrum are an estimated 21 percent less likely than those who place themselves at the center to endorse business experts. None of these ideological factors are significant predictors of other attitudes. In other words, in the Saskatchewan case at least, some of these attitudes can be interpreted in conventional ideological terms without invoking broader preferences like stealth democracy.

It is also noteworthy that the effect of identification with the government or opposition is not necessarily a stand-in for identification with the ideological “left” or “right”: in fact, those who put themselves on the left are significantly more likely to accept compromise. It is possible that ideology, as much as an overall view of democracy, is driving the different reactions to these four measurements from different segments of the Saskatchewan electorate.

The effects of partisanship are more complicated. Those strongly identifying with either the party currently in government (the Saskatchewan Party) or in opposition in the legislature (the NDP) are particularly drawn to the idea that action is preferred over debate: strong identifiers with the opposition party are an estimated 25 percent more likely than weak identifiers to strongly agree with that statement, and strong identifiers with the governing party are an estimated 19 percent more likely to strongly agree. Strong identifiers with the opposition party are similarly disinclined to approve of compromising on their principles (23 percent more likely to agree with that statement). That result is consistent with our understanding of the Saskatchewan NDP as an ideological political party that has put its social democratic principles into practice through the public policies that it has enacted when it has formed the government (McGrane 2014). Those who identify strongly with the governing Saskatchewan Party are significantly more likely (20 percent) than weak identifiers to allow business leaders a privileged voice in policy. This, too, is consistent with our understanding of the Saskatchewan Party, as a self-described “conservative” party with strong links to the province’s business community (McGrane et al. 2013).

Interestingly, different effects of ideology and partisan preferences are evident for three out of the four items. In other words, in the Saskatchewan case at least, certain of these attitudes can be interpreted in conventional ideological and party political terms without invoking broader preferences like stealth democracy. It is possible that ideology and partisanship, as much as an overall view of democracy, are driving the different reactions to these four measurements from different segments of the Saskatchewan electorate.

The relationships reported here suggest a consistent pattern across several countries in which more education and more interest in politics diminish enthusiasm for all four statements that make up “stealth democracy.” Ideological and partisan preferences also inform stealth democracy attitudes but partisans are selective in their endorsement of particular stealth democracy elements, emphasizing action over talk and disagreeing on the wisdom of relying on business leaders. Unlike classic stealth democrats, they are not drawn to the idea of a value consensus.

Stealth democracy and voting

The stealth democracy preferences outlined above suggest weariness with the input side of democracy; democratic processes are perceived as inefficient, tedious, and prone to self-interest. If this is an accurate interpretation, then one should expect to see stronger stealth democracy attitudes amongst non-voters than amongst voters. Voting is by no means the only political act that might be undermined by stealth democratic attitudes, but it is perhaps the most vulnerable. It features ambitious political elites, takes place in an atmosphere of contestation and conflict, and seldom settles policy debates. In short, voting embodies much of what stealth democrats find so discomfiting about politics.

Not surprisingly, this is the diagnosis of weak voter turnout that most appeals to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse. Citing research on the modest effect of institutional variables, such as registration requirements, they maintain that the removal of procedural obstacles will have a marginal effect on turnout (see also Aldrich 1993). The real problem, they argue (2002, 215), "is the motivation of citizens and not the fact that voting unavoidably entails a few costs. ..." They go further and maintain that herding voters to the polls is counterproductive; it only reinforces an unpleasant experience. "Why get people to participate" they ask (2002, 215), "if it just frustrates them and turns them away from politics?"

Does participation turn people away from politics? Hibbing and Theiss-Morse supply no data linking stealth democracy attitudes to non-voting, and neither do the other studies we have been considering. Research on the decision to vote, the most conspicuous act of democratic citizenship, is extensive, and several positions have emerged, including those that emphasize rational calculations and those that concentrate on social-psychological factors (Blais 2000). In what might be called the rational choice version of voter turnout, voters are assumed to make their decision to vote or not vote on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation taking into account, among other things, whether or not the electoral choice is clear and interests align with party identification (e.g., Narud and Valen 1996). That explains, proponents argue, the fact that some elections generate higher turnouts than others. On the other hand, a focus on social-psychological variables directs attention to the availability of cues that prompt citizens to activate a voting habit, assuming they have one (Aldrich, Montgomery and Wood 2011).

Stealth democratic attitudes are unhelpful on both accounts. For those who employ a voting calculus, a generalized distaste for politics presumably reduces any benefits that might attend voting. Voters who respond habitually to the electoral summons, but hold stealth democracy views, presumably arrive at the polls on cue but weakly motivated and without enthusiasm.

So far there is no empirical work linking voting behavior to stealth democracy, but the Saskatchewan data suggest that such a linkage may exist. On the stealth democracy scale itself, the non-voter mean (2.70) is significantly higher than the voter mean (2.50) ($p < .000$). Looking at the individual components of the scale reveals greater nuance. The bivariate relationships between each of these components and voter turnout are presented in Table 6. On three of the four individual measures, non-voters score significantly higher than voters on stealth democracy attributes. Non-voters are more

Table 6. Saskatchewan voter and non-voter differences in stealth democracy attitudes (% agree).

	Voters	Non-Voters	Sig
Stop talking and take action	85.6% (49.5% strongly)	88.7% (63.1% strongly)	.001
Compromise is selling out	40.4% (12.9% strongly)	56.1% (16.4% strongly)	.000
Leave decisions to independent non-elected experts	36.9% (6.6% strongly)	53.0% (16.3% strongly)	.000
Leave decisions to successful business people	28.5% (6.2% strongly)	33.2% (8.8% strongly)	.323

likely than voters to strongly agree that action is preferable to talk, to see compromise as a “sellout,” and to support leaving decisions to experts. Voters and nonvoters do not differ in their assessment of leaving decisions to business leaders. The gap between voters and non-voters on individual items further suggests that the stealth democracy measure should be broken into its component parts to appreciate their effects. The differences between voters and non-voters invite a broader interpretation. If those who have a problem with compromise also have a problem with voting, they likely have a more fundamental problem with the very nature of politics (Stoker 2006, 4). Institutions can align the pursuit of personal interests with the achievement of collective values, but even the best institutional arrangements cannot dissolve value conflict or eliminate the need to compromise. In the face of conflict, standing on one’s principles may appear to be a morally attractive option, and at times the required response, but the political path to self-rule involves, in the words of Bernard Crick (2000, 31), “conciliation rather than violence and coercion. ...” If those who struggle with compromise are, other things being equal, less interested in voting, it is no surprise and perhaps no tragedy.

Conclusion

In this article, we have reported on the popularity of stealth democracy attitudes among citizens in one Canadian province. Notwithstanding the specific focus, the research reported here makes three important contributions to the literature on stealth democracy. First, it adds to the growing body of evidence that the attitudes comprising stealth democracy are found among citizens of quite distinctive jurisdictions. Although the concept originated in the United States, where a particularly disputatious brand of politics is coupled with a constitutionally sanctioned antipathy toward government, citizens in countries with quite different political cultures and institutional environments exhibit similar attitude patterns.

Second, while Hibbing and Theiss-Morse prefer to interpret these patterns as evidence of an anti-politics outlook, the correlates of stealth democracy attitudes we uncover suggest some alternative explanations. For example, the relationship between education and stealth democracy should prompt us to consider the possibility that given their lower levels of education, those who prefer that independent experts direct public policy may lack confidence in their own opinions on policy questions (Gerber et al. 2011). Similarly, we find in the Saskatchewan data that those who want business people to make decisions actually prefer less government altogether. In short, respondents may have reasons for their answers to specific questions that have nothing to do

with a preference for stealth democracy in general. Since we find that political values and partisanship influence the answers of respondents to certain questions of the stealth democracy index, it may be asked if the Hibbing–Theiss-Morse index is measuring stealth democracy or if it is measuring ideology. It should be conceded, however, that just as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse anticipated, an aversion to compromise is related to non-voting in the Saskatchewan data, and so is a preference for action and decisions by experts. These findings link attitudes to behavior and as such constitute the strongest evidence for the integrity of the stealth democracy construct.

This brings us to a third observation, one that deals with the concept of stealth democracy itself. For a concept like stealth democracy to be a useful interpretative tool, we need to have confidence in its conceptual and empirical integrity. In the Saskatchewan data, and notwithstanding the relationship between elements of stealth democracy and non-voting, we were unable to establish a close empirical connection among the key components. Previous research has uncovered other inconsistencies. Many of the Finnish respondents, for example, showed enthusiasm for both stealth democracy and for a more extensive use of referendums, which would presumably require at least a modest investment in learning about the issues. Similarly, while British respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of action as opposed to talk, they also believed, in roughly equal numbers, that elected officials should “debate and discuss things thoroughly before making major policy decisions.” Webb (2013) concludes: “Clearly, people do not always perceive the apparent contradictions in holding such views simultaneously.”

It is possible, of course, that these “apparent contradictions” arise because too much is being asked of the concept of stealth democracy. In fact, the components of the index invite respondents to comment on issues of governing more than issues of democracy. Who should govern (experts or politicians?) and how should they govern (compromise?) are debatable topics in all systems, democratic or otherwise. The strong and consistent preference for action over deliberation is a reminder that citizens have legitimate expectations that their leaders will act on their behalf. Political scientists, including those closely associated with deliberative democracy, have begun stressing “the importance of getting things done” (Mansbridge 2012) and of governing with integrity and competence (Atkinson 2013). Bo Rothstein (2013) and his colleagues (Holmberg and Rothstein 2012) have even argued that it is far more important to attend to corrupted state institutions than to over-invest in the alleged benefits of electoral democracy.

The findings in this study, and the other stealth democracy studies reviewed here, suggest that the concept of stealth democracy should be rebuilt to better distinguish between attitudes toward democracy, attitudes toward politics, and attitudes toward governing. No single index can do justice to them all. As the authors of the Australian study (Evans, Stoker, and Nasis 2013, 18) observe, citizens “do not simply hold one view of politics but have various understandings that they can apply depending on the context and the type of politics that is on offer.” Similarly, our study of Saskatchewan voters suggests that people’s views about government and politics are more nuanced than the stealth democratic portrait allows. That does not mean that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse are wrong on the anti-politics argument, only that the narrative they propose, in which stealth democracy attitudes are widely subscribed and highly complementary, is both overstated and incomplete. It is time to develop new indices using

new questions that probe the constituent elements of stealth democracy more deeply and determine whether observed contradictions are real or artifacts of imperfect measurement.

Notes

1. According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, this tendency to underestimate conflict is said to be rooted in the psychological predisposition to overestimate consensus as a way of avoiding isolation in one's attitudes. Noelle-Neumann (1993) refers to this dynamic as the "spiral of silence."
2. Like the American study, the Finnish study and the 2012 British study find that gender and age are not related to stealth democracy preferences; however, the 2011 British and the Australian studies find that gender and age are significant. The Australian and the 2012 British studies did not consider education.
3. We also used binary logit as an alternative analytical strategy, with each dependent variable coded 0 ("strongly disagree"/ "somewhat disagree") or 1 ("strongly agree"/ "somewhat agree"). The results are very similar, and are not substantively different from those obtained using ordered logit.
4. Changes in predicted probabilities are calculated in the Stata software program using Long and Freese's SPost package of post-estimation commands (see Long and Freese 2006). The effects of interest, education, age, sex, and limited government are calculated with all other variables held constant at mean values. The effect of each ideological self-placement variable is calculated with other ideological self-placement variables held constant at zero, and all other variables held constant at their mean values. The effect of each party identification variable is calculated with the other party identification variables held constant at zero, and all other variables held constant at their mean values.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Hayley Carlson for her research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Brock University, 2014. The authors thank Heather Bastedo for her helpful comments and for alerting us to other work on stealth democracy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Michael M. Atkinson is a professor in the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Saskatchewan campus. He has published extensively in the areas of legislative studies, public administration and public policy, most recently in *Political Science Quarterly*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* and *International Public Management Journal*. His research interests include public sector compensation, political ethics, and the broad topic of good governance. He is a past-president of the Canadian Political Science Association.

Stephen White is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. His research focuses on Canadian and comparative public opinion and political behavior, and immigrant political incorporation. He is a co-editor of *Comparing Canada: Methods and*

Perspectives on Canadian Politics, and has contributed articles and chapters on North American political cultures, attitudes towards immigration, and immigrant political engagement.

Loleen Berdahl is a professor and the head of Political Studies at the University of Saskatchewan. Her research interests include Canadian federalism and regionalism, science and expertise in policy-making, public policy, and public opinion. Loleen is the project leader for the Survey and Group Analysis Laboratory (SGAL) at the University of Saskatchewan's Social Sciences Research Laboratories.

David McGrane is an associate professor of Political Studies at St. Thomas More College, University of Saskatchewan. He has published over 20 peer-reviewed articles, chapters, and academic books. His most recent research is a book entitled *Remaining Loyal: Social Democracy in Quebec and Saskatchewan* published by McGill-Queen's University Press. He currently holds a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant to write a book on the federal NDP.

References

- Aldrich, J.H. 1993. "Rational Choice and Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (1): 246–278. doi:10.2307/2111531.
- Aldrich, J.H., J.M. Montgomery, and W. Wood. 2011. "Turnout as Habit." *Political Behavior* 33: 535–563. doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9148-3.
- Allen, N., and S. Birch. 2014. "Process Preferences and British Public Opinion: Citizens' Judgements about Politics in an Anti-Politics Era." *Political Studies* doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12110.
- Anderson, C., A. Blais, S. Bowler, T. Donovan, and O. Listhaug. 2005. *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson, C.J., and C.A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *The American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 66–81. doi:10.2307/2952259.
- Atkinson, M.M. 2013. "Policy, Politics and Political Science." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 46 (4): 751–772. doi:10.1017/S000842391300084X.
- Bengtsson, A., and M. Mattila. 2009. "Direct Democracy and Its Critics: Support for Direct Democracy and "Stealth" Democracy in Finland." *West European Politics* 32 (5): 1031–1048. doi:10.1080/01402380903065256.
- Besley, T. 2006. *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. The Lindahl Lectures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blais, A. 2000. *To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Blais, A., E. Gidengel, N. Nevitte, and R. Nadeau. 2004. "Where Does Turnout Decline Come From?" *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 221–236. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00152.x.
- Costello, A.B., and J.W. Osborne. 2005. "Best Practices in Exploratory Factor Analysis: Four Recommendations for Getting the Most from Your Analysis." *Practical Assessment Research & Evaluation* 10 (7): Available from: <http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=10&n=7>
- Crick, B. 2000. *In Defense of Politics*. 5th ed ed. London: Continuum.
- Dalton, R., W. Birklin, and A. Drummond. 2001. "Public Opinion and Direct Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 12 (4): 141–153. doi:10.1353/jod.2001.0066.
- Dinno, A. 2009. "Implementing Horn's Parallel Analysis for Principal Component Analysis and Factor Analysis." *The Stata Journal* 9 (2): 291–298.
- Evans, M., G. Stoker, and J. Nasis. 2013. *How Do Australians Imagine Their Democracy? Australian Survey of Political Engagement Findings 2013*. Canberra: ANZSOG Institute for Governance at the University of Canberra.
- Franklin, M.N. 2004. *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945*. London: Sage.

- Gerber, A.S., G.A. Huber, D. Doherty, and C.M. Dowling. 2011. "Citizens' Policy Confidence and Electoral Punishment: A Neglected Dimension of Electoral Accountability." *Journal of Politics* 73 (4): 1206–1224. doi:10.1017/S0022381611000892.
- Hansard Society. 2012. *Audit of Political Engagement 9: The 2012 Report: Part Two. The Media and politics*. UK: Hansard Society.
- Hay, C. 2007. *Why We Hate Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Heffernan, R. 2002. "The Possible as the Art of Politics": Understanding Consensus Politics." *Political Studies* 50: 742–760. doi:10.1111/post.2002.50.issue-4.
- Hibbing, J., and E. Theiss-Morse. 2002. *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Belief about How Government Should Work*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Holmberg, S., and R. Bo, eds. 2012. *Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Horn, J.L. 1965. "A Rationale and Test for the Number of Factors in Factor Analysis." *Psychometrika* 30: 179–185. doi:10.1007/BF02289447.
- King, A. 2012. *The Founding Fathers versus The People: Paradoxes of American Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Long, J.S., and J. Freese. 2006. *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. 2nd ed. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- Mair, P., and I. Van Biezen. 2001. "Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000." *Party Politics* 7 (1): 5–21. doi:10.1177/1354068801007001001.
- Mansbridge, J. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515–528. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000856.
- Mansbridge, J. 2012. "On the Importance of Getting Things Done." *PS: Political Science* 45:1–8.
- McGrane, D. 2014. *Remaining Loyal: Social Democracy in Quebec and Saskatchewan*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- McGrane, D., S. White, L. Berdahl, and M. Atkinson. 2013. "Leadership, Partisan Loyalty, and Issue Salience: The 2011 Provincial Election in Saskatchewan." *Canadian Political Science Review* 7 (1): 1–12. <http://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/cpsr/article/view/362/442>
- Mendelsohn, M. 1996. "Introducing Deliberative Direct Democracy in Canada: Learning from the American Experience." *American Review of Canadian Studies* 26 (3): 449–468. doi:10.1080/02722019609481196.
- Mulaik, S.A. 2009. *Foundations of Factor Analysis*. 2nd ed. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman and Hall/CRC.
- Narud, H.M., and H. Valen. 1996. "Decline in Electoral Turnout: The Case of Norway." *European Journal of Political Research* 29: 235–256. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00650.x.
- Nevitte, N., and S. White. 2012. "Citizen Expectations and Democratic Performance: The Sources and Consequences of Democratic Deficits from the Bottom Up." In: P.T. Lenard and R. Simeon, eds. *Imperfect Democracies*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Noelle-Neumann, E. 1993. *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion—Our Social Skin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Norris, P. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, P. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rothstein, B. 2013. *The Three Worlds of Governance: Arguments for a Parsimonious Approach to the Quality of Government*. Gottenberg: The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gottenberg.
- Stoker, G. 2006. *Why Politics Matters. Making Democracy Work*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Webb, P. 2013. "Who Is Willing to Participate? Dissatisfied Democrats, Stealth Democrats and Populists in the United Kingdom." *European Journal of Political Research* 52: 747–772. doi:10.1111/ejpr.2013.52.issue-6.
- Zwick, W.R., and W.F. Velicer. 1986. "Comparison of Five Rules for Determining the Number of Components to Retain." *Psychological Bulletin* 99: 432–442. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.99.3.432.

Methodological Appendix

The Saskatchewan Election Study was conducted using WinCATI software, and 1,099 Saskatchewan residents, 18 years of age and older, responded. The results, which represent a response rate of 23.6 percent, are generalizable to the Saskatchewan population (18 years of age and older) \pm 2.95 percent at the 95 percent confidence interval (19 times out of 20). The stealth democracy index was created using respondents' mean scores for each of the four stealth democracy items. Interest in politics was measured with the question, "Using a scale from '0' to '10', where '0' means you were 'Not at all Interested' and '10' means you were 'Very Interested,' how interested were you in the recent provincial election campaign?". Ideology was tested with two measures: preferences for limited government ("In your opinion what is the best way to deal with major economic problems? Is it 'More Government Involvement' or 'Leave it to the Private Sector?") and ideological self-placement ("In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from '0' to '10,' where '0' means you are 'Very Left' and '10' means you are 'Very Right?"). For education, respondents were asked, "What is the highest level of education that you have completed," and the response categories ranged from "no schooling" to "professional degree or doctorate." We also include measures of party identification. Respondents were first asked: "Thinking about Saskatchewan politics, do you generally think of yourself as a New Democrat, a Liberal, a Saskatchewan Party supporter, some other party, or none of these?" Those who expressed a party attachment were subsequently asked whether they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed or strongly disagreed with the following statements: "When someone criticizes/praises the party, it feels like a personal insult/compliment"; "I think/don't think like a typical member of the party"; "When I talk about the party, I usually say "we" rather than "they"; and "If a story in the media criticized the party, I would feel embarrassed." Our analyses include controls for gender and age. All of the independent variables, with the exception of age (measured in years), range from zero to one.